We survey non-executive directors in emerging markets to obtain detailed information about the inner workings of corporate boards across a variety of institutional settings. We document substantial variation in the structure and conduct of boards as well as in directors' perceptions about the local legal environment. Further analysis indicates that directors who feel adequately empowered by local legislation are less likely to actively vote against board proposals. They also form boards that play a stronger role in the company's strategic decision-making. This suggests that a supportive legal environment allows directors to focus more on their advisory, as opposed to their monitoring, role.
Introduction
The board of directors forms an integral part of a firm's governance mechanisms. Board members are appointed by shareholders to promote their interests and to supervise and advise the chief executive and other executives. How boards perform this dual role of supervisor and adviser of corporate management is typically difficult to observe from outside the company, and board conduct therefore remains an underexplored topic in the literature. This holds even more so for boards in developing countries and emerging markets, where transparency and reporting requirements tend to be less advanced.
To gain a better understanding of the inner workings of the board, this paper exploits data collected through an online survey to which 130 current and past board directors responded.
These non-executive directors were on the boards of companies across 27 emerging markets, ranging from Poland in eastern Europe to Mongolia in Asia. We use these board nominees as entry points to access detailed information about the behaviour and conduct of their boards.
The survey elicits information on the board's priorities, the relationships between boards and management, the legal environment in which board members operate, board procedures and the role of independent (non-executive) directors.
Our sample comes from the set of directors appointed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to board seats in companies in which the EBRD is an investor. In addition to providing firms with debt funding, the EBRD also invests in a broad range of industries. These equity investments are usually held for a period of between four and seven years. During this period an independent director representing the EBRD typically joins the investee company's Board of Directors. Because all directors in our sample are professional nominees of a single minority investor, we can safely assume that such directors understand the need to look after the interests of non-controlling investors, which is a group that might include creditors.
Our primary contribution is to describe the inner workings of the board from the perspective of (truly) outside directors. Our analysis is mainly descriptive; sample size and data limitations make detailed statistical or causal inferences impossible. We use the survey as a tool to measure different aspects of board activity and to describe the heterogeneity in board characteristics across regions in our sample. We document substantial variation in the structure and conduct of boards, as well as in directors' perceptions about the local legal environment.
Our data allow us to create measures of advising and monitoring activity inside boards. Board advice is usually understood as active participation in decisions of a strategic nature (see, for example, Adams and Ferreira, 2007) . Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the board makes the final decision on strategic issues in more than 50 per cent of cases. This evidence shows that boards are often empowered in their advisory functions. We also measure a director's monitoring intensity by the frequency with which they vote against board proposals. We find that 69 per cent of directors have voted against board proposals at least once during their tenure. We conclude that our sample directors appear to be significantly engaged in both advising and monitoring activities.
We also use our survey to create measures of board quality and meeting quality. Our board quality index is based on five measures of best practices and competence. We find that board quality is highest in Central Asian and eastern European countries, and lowest in Russia. Our measure of meeting quality can be decomposed into meeting intensity (number of meetings, length of meetings and attendance) and information quality. We find that the number of meetings and hours spent in meetings increased between 2007 and 2009, but the quality of information provided to participants deteriorated. This suggests that board activity becomes intensified in periods of crisis, but information quality does not improve.
Lastly, our data allow some interesting comparisons across regions. As the largest country in our sample, Russia stands out with the lowest level of board participation in strategic decisions. In addition, outside directors in Russia vote against board proposals very frequently. The combined evidence suggests that directors representing minority investors face significant challenges in Russia: the board is not sufficiently empowered to engage in strategic decision-making, while controlling parties' interests often conflict with those of non-controlling investors.
This paper provides three main contributions to the board literature. First, we provide new evidence that outside directors are active participants in the decision-making process inside the firm. There is a debate in the theoretical literature on boards about the relative importance of advising and monitoring activities inside the board. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our director survey and the related sample, after which section 3 documents the main patterns in our data. Section 4 focuses on the relationship between the legal empowerment of directors and the role of boards in strategic decision-making. Section 5 concludes.
The survey and sample
The surveys to collect the information analysed in this paper were conducted through a secure online survey platform in early 2012. Each of the board members who were invited to participate had been nominated by the EBRD, an international financial institution that holds equity stakes in private companies across a variety of emerging markets. The aim of the survey was to collect information about how board members in these countries perceive their own role, that of their board, as well as the local legal and institutional environment they The second panel of Table 1 (2015) show that when Chinese companies hire directors with foreign experience, this improves firm productivity and valuation. 4 The empirical evidence suggests that larger boards are often associated with weaker firm performance (Yermack, 1996 ; and Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998).
5 Tougher boards -those with more NEDs and more independent NEDs -are associated with relatively intense monitoring and more performance-induced CEO turnover. However, such high turnover may destroy value if
CEOs are fired too often for reasons outside their control (Jenter and Kanaan, 2015) . 
Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in the paper. Appendix Table A1 contains the variable definitions. Source: EBRD Board Director Survey. Table 1 3. Inside the board: some facts
Board conduct and quality
How do boards operate in practice? The survey indicates that directors spend an average of 2.7 days a month on their board duties, but there is quite a bit of variation, with some board members spending just one day a month on their duties whereas others spend up to 10 days a month (Table 1) Table A1 , while the fifth is based on the question "How would you judge the competence and qualification level of the Board as a whole?". Respondents report that the board was "very qualified" in 67 per cent of the cases, "somewhat qualified" in 27 per cent of the cases, and "unqualified or incompetent" in 6 per cent of the cases. For our index, we construct an indicator variable that equals one if the board is very qualified and zero otherwise. Table 2 reports the averages of the board quality index across the five regions. We find that board quality is highest in eastern Europe and the Caucasus as well as Central Asia, and lowest in Russia.
Board meetings
Boards convene around five times a year and the average board meeting lasts five hours. Directors receive their papers in preparation for the meeting on average five days in advance, although practice varies a lot, with some companies distributing the relevant materials two weeks in advance whereas in other cases materials are only handed out on the day of the board meeting itself. According to the IIF (2002), the best practice is to send a notice of the meeting and the agenda at least one month prior to the meeting. About two-thirds of all directors indicate that they think that they receive sufficient information to fulfil their duties.
Worryingly, this means that a third of surveyed directors feel insufficiently informed to be able to properly fulfil their tasks.
We create a summary measure of meeting quality by averaging across five (normalised) 
Table 2 Board quality index
Board quality index board papers received. Table 3 reports the averages of this meeting quality index across the five regions. We find no significant differences in meeting quality across regions.
We then further decompose the meeting quality index into two distinct sub-indices: Meeting intensity (number of meetings; length of meetings; and attendance) and Information quality (meeting information and days before meeting that papers are received). Perhaps surprisingly, we find that Russia has the highest level of meeting information quality, although it has the lowest level of meeting intensity. Table 3 However, the quality of information provided to participants deteriorates over this period.
These findings suggest that not only do boards become more active during crises, but also that the information provided to board members tends to be of lower quality. 
Power distribution within the board
Who, in practice, has the power on companies' boards? The survey indicates that in 40 per cent of companies the board's agenda is set by the chairman of the board and in 12 per cent it is determined by the non-executive directors. In the remaining 48 per cent of companies the board's agenda is actually wholly or partially set by management. The role of the chairman of the board appears strongest in eastern Europe and the Caucasus, where it is the chairman that sets the board's agenda in 75 per cent of the companies that were analysed.
Judicial fairness and the empowerment of board directors
When board directors were asked whether courts in their country normally ruled fairly and objectively, exactly half of all board directors said they did, whereas the other said they didn't. However, perceptions of court quality vary a lot across and within regions, ranging from 81 per cent in central Europe and the Baltic states to only 21 per cent in Central Asia.
Relatedly, the survey also presented board members with a case study about a hypothetical conflict between shareholders and the board (see Annex 2 for the full case study).
Respondents were asked whether they thought that the courts in their respective countries would rule fairly and objectively in this case. The opinions were again split: around half of all board members said they did not think that this would happen.
When asked whether local legislation gives the director enough power to fulfil their role within the board, the average score is 4.6 on a scale of 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 6 ("Strongly agree"). Variation is again substantial with a standard deviation of 0.82. While 66 per cent of the directors (strongly) agree that local legislation gives them enough power, the remainder agree only somewhat or even disagree altogether. Legal empowerment is again higher in central Europe and the Baltic states (4.9) and lower in Russia (4.4).
Lastly, the survey results also indicate that in four out of five companies the government plays no role in the nomination of new directors. Yet, in 10 per cent of the companies the government plays a formal role whereas in 6 per cent it plays some kind of informal role.
Note that all companies surveyed were privately (that is, not government) owned.
Decision-making inside the board
Corporate directors often play a dual role. In their monitoring role, directors are supposed to look after the interests of all shareholders -including non-controlling ones -and, sometimes, of other stakeholders, as stated in the local corporate law. While performing their duty, directors will often find themselves in disagreement with management and controlling shareholders. Such disagreement can lead to concrete actions, such as voting against management and/or controlling shareholders. In their advisory role, directors contribute with their business expertise to the formulation and implementation of a company's strategy. As in the related literature, we define advice as the provision of inputs for strategic decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions, market entry and exit, and so on. For such advice to be meaningful, the board needs to be empowered to make strategic decisions.
In this section, we analyse two subjective measures of decision-making inside the board.
Both measures are related to how effectively directors can perform their monitoring and advisory functions. The first measure relates to the board's ability to participate meaningfully in strategic decision-making. The second measure proxies for the frequency of disagreement between directors and the rest of the board.
We first asked directors to identify "who usually makes the final decision on strategic issues". Panel A in Table 4 reports the results. We find that in 52 per cent of all cases the board makes the final decision on strategic issues, while in 41 per cent of companies it is the majority shareholder, and in the remaining 7 per cent it is management. This indicates that in most companies, board directors take an active advisory role and do not limit themselves to merely monitoring management.
The breakdown of answers reveals striking differences between regions. While Central Asian countries show the highest level of board involvement in strategic issues (71 per cent), in Russia only 41 per cent of surveyed companies effectively delegate strategic decisions to the board. One possible explanation for these cross-country differences is variation in the perception of the quality of the legal environment. Our data show that there is wide variation in how board directors assess the quality of the local legal system and the extent to which it empowers them to fulfil their role. Indeed, the first bar chart of Figure 2 shows that, when board directors feel more empowered by the local legal system (that is, the ability of local laws to empower directors is above the mean), it is much more likely that final decisions are taken by the board (58 per cent) than when directors feel less empowered (39 per cent).
We further investigate this hypothesis in Table 5 . We run OLS regressions to analyse the relationship between legal empowerment and whether the final decision authority for strategic issues lies with the board or, in contrast, with either management or the majority shareholder. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the board makes the final decision on strategic issues.
We explore the role of two legal variables that may determine whether final decisions are taken by the board. Legislation empowers is our variable that measures to what extent directors think that local legislation gives them enough power to adequately fulfil their role within the board (1: "Strongly disagree"; 6: "Strongly agree"). Second, we use a more generic variable (Court quality) which is a dummy that is 1 if the director thinks that the courts would rule fairly and objectively in the case study that was presented to them. In addition, the even columns include fixed effects for the director's home region as well as fixed effects for the country where the company is incorporated. In these columns, we thus compare board directors operating in one and the same country. Throughout the table, we also control for the respondent's Industry experience, gender (Male), whether the board is a Two-tier board and whether the firm is in the Finance sector. B) . Final decision with board is a dummy variable that is '1' if the final decisions on strategic issues are usually taken by the board and '0' if they are usually taken by management or the majority shareholder. Never votes against is a variable based on the frequency with which the director votes against board proposals (1: never; 4: often). It shows the proportion of board members that never voted against a board proposal. Source: EBRD Board Director Survey. Table 4 14
Boards and corporate decision making
The results in Table 5 confirm that if board directors are adequately empowered by local legislation, it is more likely that the boards they comprise play a stronger role in the company's strategic decision-making. Interestingly, there is no such role for the more generic question on court quality (columns 3 and 4). When we add both variables at the same time (columns 5 and 6), we continue to find a strong and significant positive relationship between director empowerment and the role of the board in strategic decisions. These results hold up independently of whether we include country fixed effects.
The second measure of decision-making inside the board is the proportion of directors who have ever voted against board proposals. Panel B in Table 4 summarizes this variable. Our data show that 69 per cent of directors have voted against board proposals at least once during their tenure. Our sample directors thus appear to be significantly engaged in monitoring activities. There is little variation in monitoring intensity across regions. We find that directors vote somewhat more frequently against proposals in Central Asia (77 per cent) and Russia (76 per cent), and more rarely in south-eastern Europe (61 per cent).
We expect independent directors to vote against projects that may harm the interest of noncontrolling investors. Thus, a high frequency of voting against projects could be explained by a combination of high levels of director independence and a large number of proposals that are harmful to the interests of non-controlling shareholders. We note, however, that the fact that a substantial minority of directors never votes against board proposals is not necessarily a bad thing, as it is quite possible for disagreements to be discussed and cleared up in the boardroom without a formal vote taking place.
The second bar chart in Figure 2 shows that the propensity to vote against board proposals is higher if board directors' judgment of the ability of local laws to empower them is below the mean (2.3 versus 1.8 when above the mean). The perception of the quality of local laws therefore cannot explain the high propensity to vote against proposals in Russia, which has the lowest perceived level of director empowering legislation.
In Table 6 we proceed to analyse the relationship between the level of legal empowerment of board directors and their propensity to vote against board proposals. The dependent variable is our indicator of the frequency with which the board director votes against board proposals
(1: "Never"; 4: "Often"). All else is as in Table 5 . The estimates point to a strongly significant negative correlation between the likelihood of voting against board proposals and board members' judgement on whether local legislation gives them enough power to fulfil their role (while controlling for other director and industry characteristics). Thus, the greater the perceived strength of local legislation, the less a board member feels the need to vote against board proposals. This suggests that board members can function in a less confrontational manner when formal legal institutions provide them with sufficient backing, as the credible threat of a resolution through courts provides important additional power to board members. In contrast, we again find no such role for the more generic question on court quality (columns 3 and 4). When we add both variables at the same time (columns 5 and 6),
we continue to find a strong and highly significant negative relationship between director empowerment and active voting behaviour.
We also note that when we include country fixed effects in the even columns we continue to find a strong negative relation between legal empowerment and voting against board proposals (the coefficient actually increases in size). This indicates that within-country variation in (perceived) legal protection is an important determinant of board conduct and not just between-country variation. Formal legal protection on the book may not apply in equal measure to all board directors, or may be perceived in different ways, and our findings suggest that those who feel most exposed to a lack of legal back-up are the ones that resort more frequently to active voting. To put it the other way around, those that feel the power of the courts on their side are also those that are most at ease in the boardroom.
We can summarize the evidence in this section as follows. First, in most cases, board directors are active decision-makers, who exercise both advisory and monitoring functions.
Second, there is significant heterogeneity across regions in how frequently directors perform these functions. Third, directors are more likely to be actively involved in strategic decisionmaking if they are more confident of the quality of the legal system. Fourth, Russia is unique among regions in that their boards have little say on strategic issues, while directors more frequently vote against board proposals.
(1) Table 6 Legal empowerment and the voting activity of board directors This table presents linear probability regressions to estimate the relationship between perceived legal empowerment and the voting activity of board directors. The even columns include fixed effects for the director's home region and country fixed effects. Table A1 contains all variable definitions. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Conclusions
This paper uses a survey of 130 non-executive board directors in 27 emerging markets to obtain detailed information about the behaviour and conduct of the boards they are part of.
We document substantial variation across and within countries in terms of how board directors perceive their own role, the role of their board, and the strength of the legal and institutional environment. Our analysis reveals that the greater the perceived protection of local legislation, the less a board member feels the need to vote against board proposals. This suggests that board members can function in a less confrontational manner when formal legal institutions provide them with sufficient backing. Moreover, our results indicate that if board directors are adequately empowered by local legislation, it is more likely that the boards they comprise play a stronger role in the company's strategic decision-making.
The evidence suggests that boards are active decision-makers, and exercise both advisory and monitoring functions. We also find that board activity becomes intensified in periods of crisis, although information quality does not improve. Finally, we find that Russia is unique among the regions included in our study. Of all regions represented in our sample, Russia has the lowest board quality score, the lowest level of board participation in strategic decisions, and the lowest perceived level of director-empowering legislation. In addition, board independence levels in Russia are quite low. Perhaps as a reflection of the difficulties of working n Russian boards, directors in our sample -who are independent by design -vote against board proposals relatively frequently. The aim of this short survey is to learn more about corporate boards in transition countries.
The survey has been sent to all current and past EBRD board nominees. Your answers will deepen our understanding of how boards currently operate, how they react to changes in the firm's environment, and how the functioning of boards differs across countries and across types of boards. We hope that the findings of this survey will help the EBRD to further develop its policies towards improving corporate governance in the transition region.
We would like to stress that your answers will be treated confidentially and will only be used in anonymous format. We can assure you that only the survey team will have access to the data. We greatly appreciate your cooperation and your willingness to share your valuable experience as board members with us. We hope you will be able to respond to this survey by 1 October at the latest. Your support is much appreciated.
Please use the red arrow bars at the bottom of the page to navigate forwards or backwards.
You can stop at any time and restart the survey by clicking on the link to the survey in the email. 
About you

